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ABSTRACT
JShield : A Java Anti-Reversing Tool
by Deepti Kundu
Java is a platform independent language. Java programs can be executed on any
machine, irrespective of its hardware or the operating system, as long as a Java virtual
machine for that platform is available. A Java compiler converts the source code into
„bytecode‟ instead of native binary machine code. This bytecode contains a lot of
information from and about the source code, which makes it easy to decompile, and
hence, vulnerable to „reverse engineering attacks‟. In addition to the obvious security
implications, businesses and the wider software engineering community also risk
widespread IP theft - proprietary algorithms, for example, that might be implemented in
Java could be easily reverse-engineered and copied.
This thesis addresses the problem of reverse engineering attacks on software
written in Java. It analyzes the present defense techniques used to protect software from
such attacks, examines their limitations and provides a new tool that implements several
anti-reversing techniques.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
"Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic."
(Arthur C. Clarke)
1.1 Reverse Engineering
The process of extracting knowledge or design blueprints from anything manmade is known as reverse engineering (Eilam, 2005). In other words, reverse engineering
may be understood as a systematic methodology for analyzing the design of an existing
device or system, either as an approach to study the design or as a
prerequisite for re-design. “Reverse engineering is the process of analyzing a subject
system to (i) identify the system‟s components and inter-relationships and (ii) create
representations of the system in another form or at a higher level of abstraction”
(Chikofsky & Cross, 1990).
In the field of software, developers sometimes do need to understand how existing
software works. The concept of reverse engineering, when applied to software leads to
many interesting consequences. Various problem areas where reverse engineering has
been successfully applied are recovery of design patterns (Antoniol et al., 2001), code
smell detection (Emden & Moonen, 2002), redocumentation of programs (Benedusi et
al., 1992), renewal of user interfaces (Merlo et al., 1995, Moore, 1998), migration of
legacy code (Canfora et al., 2000), translation of program from one language to another
(Byrne, 1991), and architecture recovery (Koschke, 2000).
Reverse engineering has proved very helpful in many ways. But on the contrary,
it has lead to many serious problems. “Each year software piracy results in billions of
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dollars in lost revenue” (Chen et al., 2006). Hacking is one of the challenges that reverse
engineering has brought into picture ( The terms „hacking‟ and „reverse engineering
attacks‟ are used interchangeably in this paper. It refers to the hacking attacks that are
based on reverse engineering). “Stealing or replicating someone else‟s ideas has always
been the easiest way of creating competitive products” (Kalinovsky, 2004). The process
of reverse engineering helps in understanding the logic of software which makes it easy
to alter its behavior or copy the algorithms. The removal of usage restrictions from
software, exploitation of software flaws, cheating in the games and breaking the digital
rights of a system are some such reasons for which the hackers resort to reverse
engineering (Stamp, 2006).
1.2 Process of Reverse Engineering
“To reverse engineer a software application it is first necessary to gain physical
access to it” (Low, 1998). The process of reverse engineering consists of three steps: (i)
Parsing and semantic analysis of code, (ii) Extracting information from the code, and (iii)
Dividing the product into components, as indicated by Figure 1 (Chikofsky & Cross,
1990). The software code is parsed and semantic analysis is performed on the parsed
code. The information thus obtained is stored in an information base and then this
information is used to understand the basic functionality and algorithms of the software.
This knowledge can be used for legitimate reasons like creating a new system with better
design and functionality or it can be misused.
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Figure 1 Process of Reverse Engineering
1.3 Anti-Reverse Engineering
The defense techniques implemented in software in order to protect it from
malicious attacks are referred to anti-reversing techniques. It has become a challenge for
the software community to protect software from attackers and to prevent its misuse. The
patent system is not quite as effective with software as it is with traditionally engineered
tangible artifacts. While a patent mandates IP protection – it is next to impossible to
prove or even suspect any IP theft in a software product that might have been the result of
a malicious reverse engineering attack on a patented competitor. After all, such a
product, implemented slightly differently from the original, yet using the same core ides
and algorithms could simply be deemed as an inventive step over „prior art‟ (Kalinovsky,
2004).
(Eilam, 2005) states in his book “It is never possible to entirely prevent reversing”
and (Chen et al., 2006) states “The goal of any “anti” reverse engineering technique is to
substantially increase the amount of work that a reverse engineering attempt entails,
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hopefully beyond the useful lifetime of a software application (or a particular version of
the application)”. This indicates that it is possible to evaluate the effectiveness of an antireversing technique using empirical metrics.
It is not easy to define criteria for evaluating the different reversing techniques.
The criteria that can be used for examining the effectiveness of a reversing technique are
(Nolan, 2004):


Potency – How confused the decompiler is?



Resilience – Can it rebuff the decompilation attempts?



Cost – How much overhead does it cause?

1.4 Anti-Reversing Tools
“Reversing is impossible without the right tools” (Eilam, 2005). There are
various software tools available on market, free as well as those costing hundreds of
dollars. The tools available for reverse engineering include disassemblers available for
extracting assembly code from the executables, debuggers for dynamic analysis of code
during execution, and decompilers for generating high-level source code from the
executables (Chen et al., 2006).
The most popular disassembling and debugging tools available include OllyDbg
(Yuschuk, 2000), IDA Pro (Guilfanov, n.d.), SoftICE (SoftICE, n.d.), WinDbg, etc.
These tools not only extract the assembly code but also help in viewing many other
details of the software. They help in analyzing and patching the code as well.
Java programs are more prone to reversing attacks as “It is more feasible to
recover Java source code from Java bytecode than it is to recover C/C++ code from
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machine code” (Cipresso, 2009). Just a few of the various decompilers available include
Jad (Kouznetsov, 1997), JODE (Hoenicke, 2002), and Jdec (Belur & Bettadapura, 2006).
A lot of research is being done in the software field in order to find out successful
ways of protecting software from reverse engineering attacks. The techniques proposed
to make reverse engineering difficult include obfuscating the code (Collberg et al., 1997),
protecting the computing platform physically (Doorn et al., 2003), encryption of
executables (Chen et al., 2006), and watermarking (Collberg & Thomborson, 2002).
1.5 Threat to Java Software
The threat of reverse engineering attacks has been taken more seriously since the
advent of Java, because the applications written in Java are easier to reverse engineer
(Cipresso, 2009). To understand why, we have to know the difference between Java
bytecode and machine code.


“Machine code or processor instructions are a system of instructions and data
executed directly by a computer‟s central processing unit” (Machine code, 2010).
These instructions are specific to the processor on which they are generated.
Figure 2 illustrates this scenario.



“Bytecode is a set of instructions that looks a lot like some machine code, but is
not specific to any one processor” (Lemay & Perkins, 1996). “It is the
intermediate representation of Java programs just as assembler is the intermediate
representation of C/C++ programs” (Haggar, 2001). Figure 3 illustrates the
generation of bytecode.

5

Figure 2 Machine Codes

Figure 3 Bytecodes
Java was designed for supporting platform-independent development. This was
done by converting the source code into platform-independent bytecode for compilation.
“Java bytecode is standardized and well documented” (Kalinovsky, 2004). It contains a
lot of information about the code and thus it can be easily decompiled to the source code.
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Another characteristic of Java that proves beneficial to the reverse engineering attackers
is the use of standard library routines which keeps the size of the application small.
The design of Java language itself, thus, makes it highly prone to reverse
engineering attacks. This has become a big problem, as a number of mission critical
applications in industries like banking, or simply closed-sourced proprietary applications
and games are being developed in the Java language. The purpose of this thesis is to
analyze the existing anti-reversing techniques that can be implemented to make Java code
immune to reversing attacks and suggest a tool that automates the process of
implementing anti-reversing techniques for Java software.
1.6 Organization of this Thesis
The work done by various researchers is discussed in Section 2.0. Section 3.0
introduces the various anti-reversing techniques and Section 4.0 discusses the tools
available for obfuscation. Section 5.0 explains the functionality provided by JShield,
along with the approaches applied in the prototype tool. It also presents validation of the
tool and verification of the results. Section 6.0 concludes the thesis and proposes the
related future work to be done in this field. In the next section, we will discuss research
done in past years.
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2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW
“Men are only as good as their technical development allows them to be.”
(George Orwell)
There is a significant body of literature documenting the work done so far in the
field of reverse engineering and anti-reverse engineering. This section cites some prior
research in the field of reverse engineering and then describes the importance of antireverse engineering and how and why it came into picture.
2.1 History
A lot has been done in the field of reverse engineering over the past 20 years
(Canfora & Penta, 2007). Research in the field of reverse engineering had started in the
early nineties. Initially, the research was mainly focused on the analysis of procedural
software for understanding it and to deal with the Y2K problem (Low, 1998).
Architecture recovery was another focus area that was facilitated by reverse engineering.
A number of techniques were proposed for component recovery.
In short, most research during the nineties was focused on three main problems
(Canfora & Penta, 2007):


Program Analysis



Design Recovery



Software Visualization
The origin of reverse engineering can be traced to software maintenance

processes and techniques. The definition of reverse engineering is quite broad today as it
encompasses a number of fields like aiding software test by creating representations of
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code (Memon et al., 2003), evaluating software design or examining software security
(DaCosta et al., 2003). (Chikofsky & Cross, 1990) states that the objective of reverse
engineering in software is “most often to gain a sufficient design-level understanding to
aid maintenance, strengthen enhancements, or support replacement”.
2.2 Relation to Reengineering
Reverse engineering is sometimes understood to be a restructuring technique used
for redevelopment of software, which is not precisely what reverse engineering is all
about. The objective of the reverse engineering techniques can be broadly classified into
two categories: redocumentation and design recovery (Canfora & Penta, 2007), as shown
in Figure 4. “Redocumentation is the creation or revision of a semantically equivalent
representation within the same relative abstraction level” (Chikofsky & Cross, 1990) and
“Design Recovery recreates design abstractions from a combination of code, existing
design documentation (if available), personal experience, and general knowledge about
problem and application domains” (Biggerstaff, 1989).

Figure 4 Objectives of Reverse Engineering

9

The argument given in support of this theory is that by definition reverse
engineering does not include restructuring or reengineering. Instead, the process of
reverse engineering is just a phase of reengineering. Reengineering can be understood as
a process with three phases - reverse engineering, architecture transformation and
forward engineering. As Figure 5 shows, the reverse engineering phase aims at obtaining
an abstraction of the target software and the forward engineering phase aims at the
restructuring part.

Figure 5 Reengineering
Figure 6 presents the Architecture Reengineering process (Kazman et al., 1998). It
indicates that architecture recovery is the reverse process of Architecture Development.
For the transformation of software architecture from one form to another, we have to
recover the coding approach followed and the architectural plan of the given software.
This in turn helps us in figuring out the design patterns implemented in the software.
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Figure 6 Architecture Reengineering
(Chikofsky & Cross, 1990) give a clear definition and distinction between the
terms reverse engineering, forward engineering, restructuring and reengineering using
three software life-cycle stages. The three life-cycle stages that they use are –
requirement analysis, design, and implementation. Figure 7 pictures the relationship
between the aforesaid terms.
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Figure 7 Relationship of terms
2.3 Decade of Achievements
A lot has been done in the field of reverse engineering over the past 20 years
(Canfora & Penta, 2007). We see significant advancements made over the past decade.
The work done in the field of software reverse engineering has been disseminated in
multiple software engineering conferences and journals. As discussed earlier, the
research work was focused on the problems of program analysis and its applications,
architecture and design recovery, and visualization. The following sections discuss the
advancements made in these fields over the past 10 years.
2.3.1 Program Analysis
A number of tools have been developed to help in the analysis of computer
programs. Initially these tools used static analysis, but eventually this approach was
found lacking for many programs where dynamic analysis was required (Systä, 2000).
Dynamic analysis is necessary in many situations and is widely used despite being
expensive and incomplete (Ernst, 2003). A number of new analysis techniques have been
developed to address the different challenges faced by the software community. For
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example, the complexity of program analysis increases with program size. So, techniques
like island parsing and lake parsing are employed to analyze only small fragments of
code at a time instead of entire programs in one go (Moonen, 2001).
Another event that inspired the research effort in the field of program analysis is
the presence of clones in software systems (Canfora & Penta, 2007). The different
techniques developed as an outcome include token-based (Baker, 1995), AST-based
(Baxter et al., 1998), and metrics-based (Leblanc et al., 1996) techniques.
2.3.2 Architecture and Design Recovery
Initially, the role of reverse engineering in the field of architecture and design
recovery was focused on recovering high level architectures from procedural code. With
the diffusion of object oriented languages and Unified Model Language (UML), it
became important to recover UML models as well from source code.
(Potrich & Tonella, 2005) proposed the static approach for recovering class
diagrams and also demonstrated that static analysis was insufficient as it did not contain
any information about flow propagation. They successfully extracted sequence diagrams
using static analysis on data flow. (Systä, 2000) recovered the UML diagrams by using a
combination of static and dynamic analysis techniques.
Another concept that had become very popular along with object-oriented
development was design patterns. Recovering the design pattern from the code was
helpful in code reuse and assessing code quality. Both static (Antoniol et al., 2001) and
dynamic analysis techniques (Heuzeroth et al., 2003) were used to recover design
patterns.
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2.3.3 Visualization
Software visualization is a blessing to the reverse engineers. A pictorial
representation of information greatly benefits both the analyzer and the developer. The
proper visualization of the program and the information extracted from its analysis is
very important for gaining clearer understanding the code. The code flow becomes much
easier to understand with a tool that is capable of presenting relevant information at the
right level of detail (Canfora & Penta, 2007). A number of such tools are available, like
Rigi (Muller et al., 1995), CodeCrawler (Marziali, n.d.), Seesoft (Easterbrook et al.,
2003), and sv3D (Feng et al., 2003). All these tools provide useful visualization of the
software using various techniques. One of these tools, Rigi, can show architectural views,
while sv3D can render software architecture metrics in a 3D visual representation. “Code
Crawler combines the capability of showing software entities and their relationships, with
the capability of visualizing software metrics using polymetric views, which show
different metrics using the width, the length, and the color of the boxes” (Canfora &
Penta, 2007).
These advancements in the field of reverse engineering not only indicate the
progress made, but also portray the potentials of reverse engineering. With the tools
developed for the purpose of helping the software community, another set of people have
been benefitted – the hacker community. With so many tools at hand, they can misuse or
reuse a lot of licensed software and the algorithms, without paying a dime to the owners.
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2.4 Future Trend
While researchers are working on development of more advanced tools to
facilitate the process of reverse engineering, in doing so, they are also making the job of
hackers much easier. With the advancement in the field of dynamic analysis of programs,
hackers can not only analyze their target software statically but can also uncover the
exact implementations of its underlying algorithms. The availability of a wide range of
efficient decompilers for high level languages like Java makes it all the more difficult to
protect software as it is now possible to recover an almost exact copy of the source code
from a class file. We have already discussed (Section 1.3) that copyrights and patents are
not very effective. So it is a big challenge for IP owners to protect their code by
incorporating anti-reversing techniques into their code.
In the next section, we will discuss about various anti-reversing techniques used
to protect java programs from malicious attacks.
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3.0 ANTI-REVERSING TECHNIQUES
"A lock only ever stopped an honest man."
(Ancient Egyptian Proverb)
3.1 Protecting Java Code
The software development community has been working on this problem of
protecting Java software for many years. The techniques that can currently be used to
protect Java source code are given in Figure 8 (Nolan, 2004). These techniques are
briefly discussed here:

Figure 8 Ways of Protecting Java Code
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3.1.1 Compilation Flags
The bytecode generated by the compiler is affected by different types of
compilation flags (Nolan, 2004). Use of the –g flag during compilation generates
debugging tables that contain information about line numbers and local variables (javac,
n.d.). This information is very useful for the decompiler to retrieve the source code. So,
compilation with –g:none keeps information like lines, vars, and the source file
attributes out of the classfile (Nolan, 2004).
3.1.2 Implementing Two Versions of the Application
It is a popular trend in the software industry to let users download a fully
functional evaluation copy of the software that can be used up to a predefined period of
time or a certain number of usages. This introduces the potential threat of malicious
users removing these limitations to activate a functional copy of the software without
having paid for it after their trial period expired. A possible solution is to implement two
versions of the software; with a cut-down trial version that does not reveal all its
functionality. Thus the user is forced to buy the original software if they like the trial
version. (Nolan, 2004)
3.1.3 Applying Obfuscation
“Obfuscated code is source or machine code that has been made difficult to
understand for humans” (Obfuscated code, 2010). There are a number of techniques used
to obfuscate code and it is the method used in this thesis. The different techniques for
obfuscation have been discussed in detail in the next section (3.2 Obfuscation
Techniques).
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3.1.4 Using Web Services and Server-Side Execution
Most modern software applications have multi-tier architectures as a best practice
– mainly to keep them maintainable, to keep different layers decoupled, accessible
through browsers, and to facilitate ease of enhancements etc. But, as a positive side
effect, splitting applications into presentation and business tiers also protects the code
from inquisitive eyes. By keeping the business layer (which contains the actual business
logic/code) on a remote server, the client side applet or application presents just the user
interface which does not contain much information, apart from, maybe remote URI‟s and
top level API‟s (Nolan, 2004).
3.1.5 Encryption
“Throughout the ages, mankind has turned to encryption when trying to protect
secret transmissions” (Nolan, 2004). A common solution suggested for preventing the
code from decompilation is to encrypt the class files. These class files are not decrypted
until before they are executed.
3.1.6 Digital Rights Management
It is clear from our discussion so far that the bytecode needs to be kept out of
reach of the end user in order to prevent them from decompiling the code. Ultimately, it
would be wiser to protect the code by simply securing the browser and class loader using
a trusted browser. The browser should not let the end user access the cache which
contains code. (Nolan, 2004)
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3.1.7 Fingerprinting the Code
Digital fingerprinting is a string of binary digits that uniquely identifies a file
(Digital Fingerprint, n.d.). It is usually in the form of a copyright notice that helps you to
identify your code. Inserting a fingerprint does not provide any protection but it helps in
protecting the copyright by providing a way for the developer to prove that the code was
originally written by him. (Nolan, 2004)
3.1.8 Selling Source Code
“If source code is so readily available, then why not just sell it at a higher price?”
(Nolan, 2004). The decompiler can be discouraged to decompile if you sell the source
code directly to him. It will bring in some more revenue for the programmer and the
programmer will not have to worry about protecting the code.
3.1.9 Employing Native Methods
We discussed in Section 1.5 that code written in Java is more difficult to protect
than that written in C/C++. (Nolan, 2004) suggests that we can protect our Java code by
compiling it in C or C++. It is possible to do this in Java by using the Java Native
Interface (JNI). It might cause portability issues but is useful if portability is not an issue.
3.2 Obfuscation Techniques
There are a number of techniques that can be used to make software immune to
reversing attacks. Many of these techniques are used by the obfuscators available in the
market. This section discusses various obfuscation techniques that can prove beneficial
in protecting Java software from reversing attacks. Before we discuss the different
techniques of obfuscation, it is important to know that obfuscation techniques can also be
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classified based upon the stage at which the obfuscation is applied. Obfuscation can be
classified into three classes (Sogiros, n.d.):
 Source code obfuscation: The obfuscation is performed on the source code.
 Bytecode obfuscation: The transformations are performed on the bytecode of the
compiled software.
 Binary code obfuscation: The obfuscation is achieved by rewriting the
instructions at machine code level.
Figure 9 gives another classification of the obfuscation techniques (Nolan, 2004,
Collberg et al., 1997) based upon how the code is obfuscated.
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Figure 9 Obfuscation – A Classification
3.2.1 Layout Obfuscation
Obfuscators available on the market work by scrambling the identifiers in the
classfile to make the decompiled source useless. The variables are renamed with
automatically generated garbage variables which do not affect the code functionality as
the classfile uses pointers to methods and variables instead of actual names. It becomes
difficult to understand the code but it is not impossible. A disassembler can be used to
rename the variables in order to generate more meaningful names. (Nolan, 2004)
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3.2.2 Control Obfuscation
The idea behind control obfuscation is to disguise the real control flow (Low,
1998). The control flow of the source code is altered to confuse anyone looking at the
decompiled code (Nolan, 2004). (Kalinovsky, 2004) states, “The best obfuscators are
capable of transforming the execution flow of bytecode by inserting bogus conditional
and goto statements”. (Collberg et al., 1997) classifies control obfuscation into three
different categories – computation, aggregation, and ordering.
3.2.2.1 Computation
Computation techniques alter the control flow in a program. It is a type of control
obfuscation which can be broken down into following techniques (Nolan, 2004):


Insert Dead or Irrelevant Code
The insertion of dead code or junk code confuses the attacker. You insert
code that will never be executed and/or will never contribute to the functionality
of the program. “This code can include extra methods or simply a few lines of
irrelevant code” (Nolan, 2004). It is important to note here that this dead code is
to confuse the decompiler and the attacker. Unless the size of program is too
small, it will take some effort and time for the attacker to figure out that those
chunks of code are actually doing nothing.
(Nolan, 2004) states, “Don‟t just limit yourself to thinking about inserting
Java code, there‟s no reason why you can‟t insert irrelevant bytecode”. The
reason why incorrect bytecode can be inserted into the class file without affecting
the functionality of the program is that the rules of bytecode format verification
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are not strictly enforced by the JRE. This corrupted code does not affect the
functionality of the original code but crashes on a decompilation effort.
(Kalinovsky, 2004)


Extend Loop Condition
Complicating the loop conditions introduces obfuscation in the code. This
can be done by extending the loop condition with a second or third condition that
doesn‟t do anything (Nolan, 2004). For example, in the following example we
have a simple if condition.
Before:

After:

int x = 1;
if (x > 200)
{
…
x ++;
// call function
abc(x)
}

int x = 1;
while (x> 200 ||
x%200==0)
{
…
x ++;
// call function
abc(x)
}

This condition is easy to understand as it has no calculation involved. But
if we replace this code with condition that does the same job but looks complex, it
might make it a little more time consuming for an attacker to understand the logic.


Reducible to Nonreducible
“The Holy Grail of obfuscation is to create obfuscated code that cannot be
converted back into its original format” (Nolan, 2004). We can devise some
transformations that make the code nonreducible to its original form. For
example, the Java bytecode has goto instruction while no equivalent statement
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exists in the Java language. So, the flow graphs produced from Java programs are
always reducible, while those from Java bytecode may express non-reducible
flow graphs. Expressing non-reducible flow graphs is inconvenient in Java due to
unavailability of goto statements, so we need to do some transformation for
converting the reducible flow graph into a non-reducible one. We can achieve
this by converting a structured loop into a loop with multiple headers (Collberg et
al., 1997). For example, see the code below:
Before:

After:

Statement 1;
while (condition1)
{
Statement2;
}

Statement 1;
if(condition2)
{
Statement2';
while (condition1){
Statement2;
}
else {
while (condition1){
Statement2;
}}

In this example, we had a simple while condition. We split the statement
to make it appear more complicated than it actually is.


Add Redundant Operands
Adding some insignificant terms to the code, in the basic calculations
confuses the reverse engineer. For example, let‟s assume that there is an integer
variable, „p‟ that stores the product of two integer variables – „a‟ and „b‟. The
code below shows we can make the calculations look complex to the attacker.
(Nolan, 2004)
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Before:

After:

public int sum{
int a = 5;
int b = 7;
int p;

public int sum{
int a = 5, b = 7;
double i = 0.0005;
double j = 0.0007;
double p;

p = a * b;
System.out.println(“
Product =” + p);
}

p = (a * b) + (i*j);
System.out.println(“
Product =” + (int) p);
}

Both of these code snippets will generate exactly the same output, just that
the second one looks more complex than the original one. (Nolan, 2004) warns
that using this technique all through the application has the potential to degrade its
performance.


Remove Programming Idioms
Most programmers reuse the code that they have written for some
previous application. In other words, they reuse the components, methods, and
classes they had written for a previous application in a slightly different manner.
The book Refactoring: Improving the Design of Existing Code (Addison-Wesley,
1999) written by Martin Fowler has created a standard for programming in Java
by presenting how to refactor some existing code into shape. Such
standardization created a series of programming idioms which prove helpful to
the hacker in reversing the code. (Collberg et al., 1997) states, “An experienced
reverse engineer will search for such patterns to jump-start his understanding of
an unfamiliar program”. So, in order to prevent such hints the programmer
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should write sloppy code. It is not good for the performance and long-term
maintenance of code but ensures that the hacker does not gather much knowledge
about your code without even reversing it. (Nolan, 2004)
According to (Collberg et al., 1997), “Most programs written in Java rely
heavily on calls to standard libraries”. This also provides a lot of information to
the reverse engineers. These calls are made to the library artifacts by name and
hence these names cannot be obfuscated. The solution to this problem is to make
your own version of standard libraries and then calling them instead. (Collberg et
al., 1997)


Parallelize Code
One thing that can staggeringly increase the complexity of your program
is the introduction of threads (Nolan, 2004). The parallelization process is usually
done to increase the performance, but the motive of introduction of threads is to
hide the actual flow of code from the hacker (Collberg et al., 1997). The two
suggested methods of doing this by (Collberg et al., 1997) are:
1. Create dummy processes which do not actually perform anything useful.
2. Split a sequential section of the program into multiple sections executing
in parallel.
(Nolan, 2004) points out that there is a programming overhead to ensure
that the threads are in proper order and is not interfering with the proper
functioning of the program.
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3.2.2.2 Aggregation
Aggregation obfuscation alters how statements are grouped together (Gupta,
2005). (Collberg et al., 1997) has included following techniques in this category:


Inline and Outline Methods
In Java, inlining (replacing a method call with the actual body of method)
results in ballooning of code which makes it difficult to understand the code. It
makes inlining an excellent technique to obfuscate the code. It should be noted
that this is a one way transformation. Once the method call has been replaced by
the actual code, the function is removed and all traces of abstraction are removed
from the code. (Collberg et al., 1997)
“You can also balloon the code by taking some of the inlined methods and
outlining them into a dummy method that looks like it‟s being called but doesn‟t
actually do anything” (Nolan, 2004).



Interleave Methods
It is an important and difficult task in reverse engineering to detect
interleaved code (Collberg et al., 1997). (Rugaber, 2000) writes:
“Subcomponents interact with each other. If the interactions are limited
and occur through explicit interfaces, the component is said to be encapsulated.
If, usually for reasons of efficiency, two or more design ideas are realized in the
same section of code or by the same data structure, then the components
corresponding to those ideas are said to be interleaved.”
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Two methods of a class can be interleaved by merging their parameter lists
and adding an extra parameter that will differentiate between the calls to
individual methods (Collberg et al., 1997). It is a significantly more difficult task
to separate out the interleaved methods as compared to interleaving them (Nolan,
2004). For illustration of this technique we consider the following example where
we have combined two methods, calTax and emailSalDetails into one method
calTaxEmailSalDetails just to confuse the hacker.
Before:
void calTax (int employeeGrade, double salary){
if(employeeId < 4){
printSalaryStub (salary*0.3);
} else{
printSalaryStub (salary*0.4);
}
void emailSalDetails (int employeeId){
printHeader();
printSalDetails(employeeId);
printFooter();
}
After:
void calTaxEmailSalDetails(int choice, int
employeeId, int employeeGrade, double salary){
printHeader();
if (choice == 1){
if(employeeId < 4){
printSalaryStub (salary*0.3);
} else{
printSalaryStub (salary*0.4);
}
else{
printHeader();
printSalDetails(employeeId);
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printFooter();
}}}



Clone Methods
It is important for a reverse engineer to understand the purpose of a
function and it is equally important to understand the different conditions under
which the function is called (Collberg et al., 1997). We can create clones of a
function and make calls to these functions under identical circumstances. We can
call the function depending on any external factor, which appears to be a deciding
factor but is actually not. One good example would be to call a different function
based on the day of the week. (Nolan, 2004)



Loop Transformations
In order to improve the performance of numerical applications, a number
of loop transformations have been designed. Some of these transformations tend
to increase the complexity of the code and hence are of interest to us (Collberg et
al., 1997). Some of these transformations are – loop blocking (“breaks up the
iteration space so that the inner loop fits in cache thus improving the cache
behavior” (Collberg et al., 1997)), loop unrolling (“replicates the body of the loop
one or more times. If the loop bounds are known at compile time, the loop can be
enrolled in its entirety” (Collberg et al., 1997)), and loop fission (“turns a loop
with compound body into several loops with the same iteration space” (Collberg
et al., 1997)).
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3.2.2.3 Ordering
Ordering transformations relate to altering the order in which the statements will
be executed in the application (Gupta, 2005).


Reorder Statements and Expressions
The reordering of statements and expressions does not complicate the code
much for the reverse engineer. But reordering the expressions obfuscates the
code significantly if applied at bytecode level as it disrupts the link between the
Java source code and bytecode. (Nolan, 2004)



Reorder Loops
A simple obfuscation technique is to reorder the loops. For example,
transforming a loop so that it moves backwards. It is shown below:
Before:

After:

val = 0;
while (val < maxVal)
{
arr[val] += res[val];
val++;
}

val = maxVal;
while (val >0)
{
val--;
arr[val] += res[val];
}

3.2.3 Data Obfuscation
Data obfuscation techniques refer to the transformations that obnubilate the data
structures in the source code. These techniques are classified into four categories based
on how they affect data – storage and encoding, aggregation, and order. (Collberg et al.,
1997)
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3.2.3.1 Storage and Encoding
These techniques target the data structures. They change the way data is stored
and how the stored data in interpreted. For example, changing the type of a variable or
replacing an existing value of a variable with a more complex looking equivalent. We
will now discuss all these techniques in detail here.


Change Encoding
(Collberg et al., 1997) show a simple example of encoding in the paper.
An integer variable i = 1 is transformed into i' = x*i+y. If we choose x
= 6 and y = 5, we get transformations shown below:



Before:

After:

int i = 1;
while (i <= 100) {
result = arr[i-1];
i++;}

int i = 11;
while (i <= 605) {
result = arr[(i5)/6];
i+=6;}

Split Variables
The variables with restricted range like Boolean can be split into two or
more parts in order to make them less obvious to the reverse engineer. (Collberg
et al., 1997) says, “We will write a variable V split into k variables p1, …, pk as V
= [p1, …, pk].” For example, if we have to define the Boolean value of a
variable bool = true, then we can split it into bool1 = 0 and bool2 =1,
and use the following lookup table to change it back to the Boolean value. (Nolan,
2004)
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bool1 bool2

bool

1

0

false

0

1

true

Convert Static to Procedural Data
The strings in the source are used to store very critical information like
copyright information. If this static data is converted to procedural data, the job
of the hacker will become significantly tough. As an example, the copyright
information could be generated programmatically within the code rather than
being stored directly in a string. This kind of transformation is not very practical
as it is not trivial to implement and it cannot be automated. (Nolan, 2004)

3.2.3.2 Aggregation
Aggregation transformations change the grouping of the data. An example is
splitting an array into several sub-arrays. (Gupta, 2005)


Merge Scalar Variables
“The variables can be merged together, or converted to a different base
and then merged together. The variables‟ values can be stored in a series of bits
and pulled out using a variety of bitmask operators (Nolan, 2004).”



Class Transformations
A series of class transformations can prove helpful in making the program
difficult to understand. As the depth of an application‟s class hierarchy increases,
so does its complexity. One good way of achieving this is to use inheritance and
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interfaces to the extreme to create deep class hierarchies that will make it more
difficult for the hacker to understand the application. (Nolan, 2004)
Inserting a bogus class can confuse the reverse engineer. But it is
important that the bogus class should be called by the actual program else
shrinker (Section 3.3) will very easily get rid of the class.


Array Transformations
Just like variables, we can split, merge, or interleave arrays in order to
obfuscate the code. We can split the array depending on the index position –
placing all the values on even indices stored in one array and those on odd indices
in another. (Nolan, 2004)

3.2.3.3 Ordering
As noted in the previous section, randomizing computations obfuscates the code.
Similarly, randomizing the order of declarations also confuses the reverse engineer..
(Collberg et al., 1997)


Reorder Methods, Arrays, and Instance Variables
It is a good idea to just move methods, arrays and data declarations across
the code, so that the reverse engineer spends some time figuring out details of
each. We should ensure that the data elements remain in the appropriate scope
while doing this. (Nolan, 2004)

3.3 Some Terminology
Before we move on to the next section, it will be helpful to understand a few
terms clearly.
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Shrinker:
Shrinking removes all the unused code from the application. It is not
exactly an obfuscation technique but many tools do provide shrinking as an
additional benefit (Kalinovsky, 2004). Eliminating the unused code reduces the
size of the jar file.



Optimizer:
An optimizer helps to optimize and verify the compiled Java applications.
It analyses the application for problems like memory leaks, code bottlenecks,
presence of unwanted attributes in classfile, etc. It improves the performance of
the application. (Foley, 2009)



Obfuscator:
A tool that applies obfuscation techniques to software in order to protect it
from reverse engineering attacks is called an obfuscator.



Preverifier:
“Preverification performs certain checks on the Java bytecode ahead of
runtime. If this first verification pass is OK, the preverifier annotates the classfiles
and then saves the annotated class files” (jGuru, 2000). When Kernel-based
Virtual Machine (KVM) attempts to execute the application, it checks the Java
class files for these preverification annotations. If the proper annotations are
present in the class files, it guarantees that certain compile-time checks were
made. So the verification and the security checks of KVM are passed faster, thus
ensuring faster execution times. (jGuru, 2000)
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In the next section, we will examine the functionality and capability of
some existing tools.
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4.0 EXISTING OBFUSCATORS
“It has become appallingly obvious that our technology has exceeded our humanity.”
(Albert Einstein)
4.1 Tool Support
There are a number of tools on the market, both open source and commercial that
claim to obfuscate software, making it immune to reverse engineering attacks. These
include ProGuard (Lafortune, n.d.), Jshrink (Eastridge Technology, n.d.), Zelix
KlassMaster (Zelix KlassMaster, n.d.), and Semantic Designs Java Obfuscator (Semantic
Designs, n.d.). Table below highlights the features of each one of them (Google
directory, n.d.).
Table 1 Java Obfuscators
Tool

Works on

Feature

Type of Tool

ProGuard

Bytecode

Shrinker, Optimizer, and
Obfuscator

Open Source

Jshrink

Bytecode

Obfuscator

Commercial

Zelix KlassMaster

Bytecode

Obfuscator

Commercial

Semantic Designs
Java Obfuscator

Source code

Obfuscator

Commercial

An obfuscator can definitely protect software to a certain extent. But it does not
imply that the software cannot be reverse engineered. With enough time and effort, an
attacker can still retrieve enough information about the software and misuse it. We
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discussed in Section 1.3 that the level of security that is provided by any obfuscator
depends on three factors – potency, resilience, and cost. (Nolan, 2004)
4.2 Brief Analysis of Existing Tools
Table 2 compares the popular Java Obfuscators available in market. Different
obfuscators are listed along with the anti-reversing techniques that they use in order to
obfuscate Java programs. It also compares their prices. This comparison is not for all
the techniques that we discussed in Section 3.0; it just verifies if the tool implements at
least one technique from that category.
Table 2 Comparison of Java Obfuscators
PRODUCT

ProGuard

Jshrink
$95

Zelix
KlassMaster
$199-$399

Semantic Designs
Java Obfuscator
$200-$260

Price

Free

Layout
Obfuscation

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Data
Obfuscation
Control
Obfuscation

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Shrinking

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Optimization

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

4.2.1 ProGuard
“ProGuard is a free Java class file shrinker, optimizer, obfuscator, and preverifier.
It detects and removes unused classes, fields, methods, and attributes. It optimizes
bytecode and removes unused instructions. It renames the remaining classes, fields, and
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methods using short meaningless names. Finally, it preverifies the processed code for
Java 6 or for Java Micro Edition.” (Lafortune, n.d.)

Figure 10 ProGuard
We used a simple calculator program to test all these tools. Our program was
packaged in a jar file called calc.jar and this is how we will refer to it hereafter.
Observations:
ProGuard is available for free use under the GPL (General Public License). We
used ProGuard to obfuscate calc.jar. Here is my list of observations:


The resultant jar file (referred to as calc_proguard.jar hereafter) did not execute
successfully.
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We were able to decompile cal_proguard.jar using Jad (Kouznetsov, 1997).



After decompiling the cal_proguard.jar, we compared it with the program‟s
original source code. The techniques used by ProGuard to obfuscate code are –
layout obfuscation and data obfuscation.



ProGuard uses name mangling to implement layout obfuscation. All the methods
and variable names were converted to single alphabets like a, or b, so on. It also
provides an option to generate a mapping file to print the mapping between the
old names and new names for classes and class members.



Data obfuscation was implemented by reordering the methods. The control flow
was left undisturbed.



Additionally, debugging information was removed by the tool. It is not exactly an
obfuscation technique but helps improve security by removing any hints for the
reverse engineer in the form of line numbers, vars, etc.



Table 3 summarizes the obfuscation techniques implemented by ProGuard.
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Table 3 ProGuard Obfuscation Observations
PROGUARD

Yes

No

Did the .jar file run after the
obfuscation?
Name Mangling

√
√

String Encryption

√

Control Flow Obfuscation

√

Reorder Methods

√

Remove Debugging
Information

√

4.2.2 Jshrink
Jshrink is a Java obfuscator that shrinks the program size by removing unused
code and data. It obfuscates symbolic names and performs optimization on the code.
Jshrink does produce its results in form of a Java jar file. It comes with an inbuilt
decompiler that is used to validate its results. (Eastridge Technology, n.d.)
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Figure 11 Jshrink
Observations:
An evaluation version of Jshrink is available for free, and the cost of getting a
licensed copy of Jshrink is $95. We used Jshrink to obfuscate calc.jar and our
observations are listed below:


The resultant jar file (referred to as calc_jshrink.jar hereafter) did execute
successfully.



None of the methods or variables was renamed in my example. The strings were
left without any encryption.
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No control flow obfuscation was implemented. The tool successfully removed all
debugging information.



Table 4 summarizes the obfuscation techniques implemented by Jshrink.

Table 4 Jshrink Obfuscation Observations
JSHRINK
Did the .jar file run after the
obfuscation?

Yes

No
√

Name Mangling

√

String Encryption

√

Control Flow Obfuscation

√

Reorder Methods

√

Remove Debugging
Information

√

4.2.3 Zelix KlassMaster
The various techniques that Zelix KlassMaster uses in order to obfuscate
applications are – name obfuscation, flow obfuscation, line number scrambling, and
string encryption. It also applies some shrinking, which reduces the size of the input file.
Figure 12 shows the user interface provided by the tool.
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Figure 12 Zelix KlassMaster
Observations:
An evaluation version of Zelix KlassMaster is available for free, and the cost for
getting a licensed version is $199-$399. We obfuscated calc.jar using Zelix KlassMaster.
Here is a list of observations:


The resultant jar file (referred to as calc_zelix.jar hereafter) did execute
successfully.



Zelix KlassMaster successfully mangled the names of the methods and the
variables of the class.



Strings which were in plain text prior to obfuscation were successfully encrypted.



It changed the loops thus altering the control flow for functions. It did these
changes to only one function in my example (It is a limitation of the trial version.
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Zelix KlassMaster claims that the same code obfuscation is implemented to all the
functions in the commercial version of the tool)


The data was not restructured. It was left unaltered.



Table 5 summarizes the obfuscation techniques implemented by Zelix
KlassMaster.

Table 5 Zelix KlassMaster Obfuscation Observations
ZELIX KLASSMASTER

Yes

Did the .jar file run after the
obfuscation?

√

Name Mangling

√

String Encryption

√

Control Flow Obfuscation

√
√

Reorder Methods
Remove Debugging Information

No

√

4.2.4 Semantic Designs Java Obfuscator
The Java obfuscator from Semantic Designs is not available for trial. Semantic
Designs claims that the tool scrambles the source code making it difficult to reverse
engineer. The features that the tool provides are as following:


Name mangling to replace the identifiers with meaningless names.



Changes the structure of the code and removes all the comments – to preserve
copyright information.
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Figure 13 shows a section of code obfuscated by the tool (Semantic Designs, n.d.)
(adopted from the company website, as the tool is not available for trial):
Before:

After:

Figure 13 Semantic Designs Java Obfuscators – Output
Another fact worthy of being noted here about the commercially available tools is
that each tool itself implements only a subset of the available anti-reversing techniques
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but none of them implements all the techniques. (Nolan, 2004) states, “Most of the Java
obfuscators you‟ll meet only perform layout obfuscation with some limited data and
control obfuscation.”
The reason is that the automation of many of these techniques is very complicated
and it has a tendency to alter the logic, and in some cases, affect the portability of the
program. (Nolan, 2004) also verifies this fact, “…the main reason Java obfuscators don‟t
feature more high-level obfuscation techniques is because the obfuscated code has to
work on a variety of Java Virtual Machines (JVMs).”
4.3 Summary
The availability of so many tools in the market clearly indicates the importance of
the anti-reversing. The software community needs a strong defense against hackers as
current anti-reversing techniques do not make hacking impossible; they just make it
difficult and time-consuming.
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5.0 PROPOSED TOOL - JShield
“All perceiving is also thinking, all reasoning is also intuition, all observation is also
invention.”

(Rudolf Arnheim)

5.1 Introduction
Applying anti-reversing techniques is a complex procedure. It involves detailed
scrutiny of the code, extracting information about its design, and making changes to the
data and control flow without altering the program logic. Our tool – JShield, automates a
number of obfuscation techniques discussed earlier in this paper. The automation of all
the techniques is very difficult because of their complexity and limitations of the
implementation language. Manual application of all the techniques is not feasible as it is
time consuming and becomes unmanageable with increase in the program size and
complexity.
5.2 JShield Functionality
This section outlines the functionality and features provided by JShield. The tool
analyzes Java code and applies various obfuscation techniques to the code to make it
harder to reverse engineer. JShield is a relatively small tool that uses an ANTLR
(ANTLR, n.d.) generated parser to parse the input Java source code. “ANTLR (ANother
Tool for Language Recognition) is a language tool that provides a framework for
generating parser from grammatical descriptions” (ANTLR, n.d.) (See Appendix A for
details). As a proof of concept for our findings, JShield currently works on a single Java
file at a time and generates an obfuscated output that is remarkably difficult to reverse
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engineer. It can be easily modified and extended to obfuscate an entire project containing
several Java source files. Figure 14 shows a screenshot of the JShield user interface.

Figure 14 JShield
5.3 Techniques Implemented by JShield
The JShield code itself uses the data structures listed in Section 5.4.1. It then
works based on the information generated by the parser. JShield applies the following
obfuscation techniques to a Java program: (All the obfuscation techniques implemented
by JShield are adopted from Section 3.2 suggested by (Collberg et al., 1997) and (Nolan,
2004)).


Layout Obfuscation
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o Scramble identifiers


Control Obfuscation
o Insert dead or irrelevant code
o Extend loop condition
o Add redundant operands



Data Obfuscation
o Insert bogus class
o Reorder methods
o Convert static to procedural data
The algorithms for implementing each one of these obfuscation techniques are

discussed in detail in Section 5.4.3.
5.4 Design and Implementation
5.4.1 Implementation Platform
JShield is implemented in C# and uses an ANTLR generated parser (ANTLR,
n.d.) for parsing the program. The IDE used for development is Microsoft Visual Studio
2005. The tool applies all the obfuscation techniques in one step and gives the option of
reviewing the code before it is saved. The input and output are both Java source code.
As mentioned above, the tool uses various data structures for implementing different
obfuscation techniques. The responsibility of these data structures is given in Table 6
below:
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Table 6 Data Structures used in JShield
Data Structure Name

Type

Responsibility

importArrayList

Array List

packageArrayList

Array List

methodArrayList

Array List

variableArrayList

Array List

Stores all the imports of the
program
Stores the package
information of the java class
Stores the list of all the
methods implemented in the
source code
Stores the list of all the
variables used in the
program
Stores the list of reference
objects created in the class
This array list stores the
information of all the
globally declared variables
The static strings appearing
in the code are stored in this
array list and are obfuscated
The mapping of the method
names and variable names
to their respective
obfuscated values is stored
in this hashtable.

calledMethodArrayList Array List
globalVarArrayList

Array List

staticStringList

Array List

mapAlteredCode

Hashtable

5.4.2 Control Flow
The control flow of the tool is illustrated in Figure 15. The ANTLR parser is used
to parse the source code. The parser class generated by ANTLR was first altered to
capture information about the source code. We added functions and member variables in
the parser class to capture the target program information dynamically at run time -
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including method names, variable name, static strings declared in the target code, etc.
The parser class holds the lists of parsed methods, variables and static strings in different
data structures as described in Section 5.4.1. The MD5 hash of the static strings is
generated using an inbuilt function of C#. The method and variable names are
obfuscated using a random function. The mapping of the original values and the
obfuscated values is stored in a hash map. The original values are then replaced with
these obfuscated values in the parsed source code. After the name mangling completes,
other obfuscation techniques are then applied. The examples of all the obfuscation
techniques implemented are given in Section 5.4.3.
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Figure 15 JShield: Control Flow
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5.4.3 Algorithm and Result
5.4.3.1 Scramble Identifiers
As introduced in Section 3.2.1, scramble identifiers are used to change the names
of variables and methods to meaningless strings. This makes it difficult for the reverse
engineer to derive meaningful hints from the actual names given by the programmer. It
targets the layout of the code and hence falls under the category of layout obfuscation
(Gupta, 2005).
Intent: To replace the method and variable names with meaningless strings.
Algorithm:
1.

Using he ANTLR parser (JShieldGramParser):
a. Read the names of all variables and methods in two separate array lists
(variableArrayList and methodArrayList respectively)
(Roperia, 2009)

2. Create an array list (keyList) to hold Java keywords and library function names
that are not to be renamed
3. Remove the keywords appearing in keyList from methodArrayList and
variableArrayList
4.

An inbuilt function is used to generate a random string for each name in the
methodArrayList. The index of the method name in the list is passed to it as
parameter.
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5. Store the mapping of original and obfuscated names in a hash table
(mapAlteredCode) where the original name is stored as the key and the
obfuscated name is stored as the value
6. All the variable and method names are replaced in the parsed code using the
mapping now present in mapAlteredCode
Input Validation:
For our proof of concept, the input given to JShield was the simple calculator
program written in Java described earlier in chapter 4, where we documented its use in
evaluating existing tools. Figure 16 shows the constructor of the input program‟s main
java class before obfuscation. The original variable names are very helpful in
understanding the program. For example, the button that clears the contents of the
display is named “clearButton”. After the program has been obfuscated by our tool,
the variable names get converted to meaningless strings, as shown in Figure 17.
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Figure 16 Scramble Variable Names: Before
In the screenshot above, we can see the altered variable names. For example,
“_displayfield” got replaced by “k”, “clearButton” to “abcfqc”, and so on.

Figure 17 Scramble Variable Names: After
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Similarly, the method names are also converted to meaningless strings. The tool
takes care of not converting the constructor name and other library classes like
ActionListener. The names of accessors and mutators are also obfuscated in order
to make the code look complicated to the reverse engineer. In our simple calculator
program, the method names shown in Figure 18 are obfuscated and result into names
given in Figure 19. A few examples of such conversion from our test runs are presented
here:
Before obfuscation

After obfuscation

CalcLogic

ljcfhfccdn

getTotalString

ljcfhfccden

setTotal

ljcfhfccdejn

Subtract

ljcfhfccdejln

Figure 18 Scramble Method Names: Before
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Figure 19 Scramble Method Names: After
5.4.3.2 Insert Dead or Irrelevant Code
As introduced in Section 3.2.2.1, insertion of dead or irrelevant code falls under
the category of control obfuscation. Adding irrelevant code alters the control flow of the
program thus making the program more obscure than the original (Gupta, 2005).
Intent: To insert dead or irrelevant code.
Algorithm:
1. Parse the code using the ANTLR parser (ANTLR, n.d.)
2. Create code templates to be inserted in the source code. The code templates
should be syntactically correct.
3. Search the parsed code for the method signature of main() – the starting and
ending braces. Return index of the method starting point.
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4. Randomly insert one of the code templates into the target code using the index
position. The junk code is inserted in first position if the class has only one
method and at random position if the class has more than one method.
Input Validation:
To validate the insertion of junk code, the input given to the tool is a simple
program that displays today‟s date. The code input is given in Figure 20. The output of
the code after obfuscation is given in Figure 21.
The tool has inserted a new method “getPassword” and instantiated an
arbitrary class “verifyPasswordUserExchange_def()”, which was inserted by
the tool. The simple program now looks complicated and it will be more time consuming
to figure out the control flow of program.

Figure 20 Inserting Dead Code: Before

58

Figure 21 Inserting Dead Code: After
5.4.3.3 Extend Loop Condition
As described in Section 3.2.2.1, the basic idea behind extending the loop
condition is to make the termination condition more complex (Collberg et al., 1997). The
loop condition is extended adding a predicate to the condition. The predicate should not
affect the number of times the loop will execute.
Intent: To add a predicate to the loop condition
Algorithm:
1. Parse the code using ANTLR parser (ANTLR, n.d.)
2. Declare a variable in the code with a constant value:
v_addIfCondition = 10;
3. Search the parsed code for “if” conditional loop and return the index of “(” that
points to the start of the condition
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4. Insert predicate “v_addIfCondition%2 == 1” to the loop condition with an
OR operator “||”.
The loop condition will evaluate to the same value as before.
Input Validation:
For extending the loop condition we parsed the program of simple calculator
using JShield. The code has a code segment with “if” condition that checks if the value
of keyTop variable is empty as shown in Figure 22.

Figure 22 Extend Loop Condition: Before
After the code was obfuscated by JShield, the output is given in Figure 23. The
if loop conditional statement now has an additional condition that is
v_addIfCondition%2 ==1, which will always evaluate to true. The variable
v_addIfCondition is declared by the tool and inserted with its value set to 10.
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Figure 23 Extend Loop Condition: After
5.4.3.4 Insert Bogus Class
We discussed in Section 3.2.3.2, inserting a bogus class increases the amount of
effort reverse engineer has to put in order to understand the program. The class should
appear as part of the logic of the program. To ensure this, the bogus class initialized in
the main class and the function calls are made to the member functions of the bogus
class. If it does not appear to be related to the logic of program, the reverse engineer will
ignore it.
Intent: Insert bogus class to the program
Algorithm:
1. Parse the code using ANTLR parser (ANTLR, n.d.)
2. Create a static variable
3. Initialize the variable with a randomly generated string (using inbuilt random
function).
4. Create a template bogus class and use the randomly generated static variable
as its name. For example, “verifyUserPasswordExchange_def” and check if
another class exists with the same name in the target source code:
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a.

If no, save the template class at the location where the target
program is located.

b.

If yes, repeat step 3.

5. Search for the starting index of the main function in the target program.
6. Define a static instance of the class and insert it before the given index
position. For example,
7. static verifyUserPasswordExchange_def u_validity = new
verifyUserPasswordExchange_def();
8. Use the instance created (“u_validity” in the example) in the inserted junk
code templates to ensure that the bogus class is not deleted by a shrinker.
Input Validation:
The code for the inserted bogus class is given in Figure 24. The file is saved at
the location where target program is stored. Figure 25 shows the package structure of the
workspace after insertion of bogus class.
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Figure 24 Bogus Class Example
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Figure 25 Eclipse Workspace: After Bogus Class Insertion
5.4.3.5 Reorder Methods
As described in Section 3.2.3.3, reordering of methods does not alter the control
flow but obfuscates the program by hiding the control flow. By convention, most of the
programmers do write functions in an order which makes it easy for the reverse engineer
to understand. By altering the order, we can increase the time to be taken by reverse
engineer to understand the logic.
Intent: Change the order of the methods in class
Algorithm:
1. Parse the code using ANTLR parser (ANTLR, n.d.)
2. Create templates of bogus methods to be inserted in the source code
3. Find out the number of methods present in the class and return starting index of
each function
4. If there is only one function (main()), insert the code template before the main
method, else insert the code template at random position before one of the
functions
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Input Validation:
The code segment from the program obfuscated using JShield is shown in Figure
26. The program has just one method i.e. main(), so the code template is added at the
index right before the main method. The output of the code is shown in Figure 27.

Figure 26 Reorder Methods: Before

Figure 27 Reorder Methods: After
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5.4.3.6 Convert Static to Procedural Data
As discussed in Section 3.2.3.1, strings with important information about the
program can give out a lot of hints about what a section of code is trying to achieve. It
may also contain some copyright information. Such strings should be encrypted in order
to protect integrity of data.
Intent: Encrypt static strings appearing in the program
4. A corresponding decrypt function is created in the bogus class.
5. All static strings are replaced by decrypt function in the input file, passing encrypted
string as parameter.
Algorithm:
1. Extract all static strings present in the code during parsing and store in an array
list staticStringList
2. Apply encryption to all the strings (We used simple Caesar cipher with a shift of
3) using encString (string plainText)
3. Create decryption function to decrypt the strings in the bogus class, named
str_toUpper()
4. For each string in staticStringList, replace all static strings by decrypt
function in the input file, passing encrypted string as parameter
For example:
System.out.println("Enter year"); gets converted to:
System.out.println(OBJ_ANM.str_toUpper("Hqwhu#|hdu"));
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Input Validation:

Figure 28 Before String Obfuscation

Figure 29 After String Obfuscation
5.4.3.7 Add Redundant Operands
As described in Section 3.2.2.1, adding some insignificant terms to the code, in
the basic calculations confuses the reverse engineer. This type of obfuscation can be
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done by adding some code with a conditional loop which always returns true and does
not affect the functionality of the code.
Intent: Add redundant operand
Algorithm:
1. Parse the code using ANTLR parser (ANTLR,n.d.)
2. Declare two integer variables x and y in the code and initialize them to any
arbitrary integer values
3. Find the index position of a function call statement and insert “if(7x2 – 1 ==
y2”) before the call
4. The statement will be executed as per the control flow of the program
Input Validation:
The tool adds redundant operands in the form of opaque predicates. For example,
in the code shown in Figure 30 the “if” loop has conditional statement (7x2 – 1 ==
y2) which will always be true and hence will not alter the actual control flow of the
program. If there are a lot of redundant operands in the program, the actual control flow
appears more complex than without obfuscation.
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Figure 30 Redundant Operand: Example 1
Another example of redundant operand is given in Figure 31. The variable
v_addIfCondition is declared as a global variable with value 10. The condition
inserts an additional statement “v_addIfCondition%2 == 1” which will always
return true and hence the loop remains unaltered.

Figure 31 Redundant Operand: Example 2
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5.4.4 Result Validation
Table 6 compares different tools with JShield on the basis of the different
obfuscation techniques implemented by each of them. Most of the commercial tools on
the market do not reveal the exact algorithms or techniques that they use in order to make
the program stronger against the reverse engineering attacks. The question marks “?” in
the table indicate that the tool implements at least one of the techniques listed in the
category but does not reveal the details. Based on the information given by the
developers of these tools, it is evident that most of the tools do not apply much of control
flow obfuscation except Zelix KlassMaster.
Also, it is worth noticing that many obfuscators remove the dead code which
contradicts with the basic principle of obfuscation. The data obfuscation techniques
emphasize the importance of inserting bogus class and control obfuscation technique
indicates the usefulness of having dead or irrelevant code. By removing the unused code
from the program, we might make the job of reverse engineer easier.
5.4.4.1 Observations


JShield implements maximum number of obfuscation techniques as compared to
any other tool on the market.



All the tools on market implement different set of techniques while JShield
provides a prototype for a tool that implements most of these techniques in one
place.



JShield makes the Java code difficult to reverse engineer by applying various
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obfuscation techniques. The techniques that can be implemented to enhance the
tool are mentioned in Section 6.2. It is left as future work to enhance the
capabilities of the tool to make it a commercially useful tool.
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Table 7 Comparison of Tools
Obfuscation Techniques

JShield

ProGuard

Jshrink

Layout Obfuscation
Scramble Identifiers
Control Obfuscation
Insert dead or
irrelevant code
Extend loop condition
Reducible to nonreducible
Add redundant
operands
Removing
programming idioms
Parallelize code
Inline and outline
methods
Interleave methods
Clone methods
Loop transformations
Reorder statements,
loops, expressions
Data Obfuscation
Change encoding
Split variable
Convert static to
procedural data
Merge scalar
variables
Factor/ Refactor class
Insert bogus class
Split/ Merge/ Fold/
Flatten arrays
Reorder methods and
instance variables
Reorder arrays

√
√
√
√

√
√
-

√
?
-

Zelix
KlassMaster
√
√
√

-

-

?

√

-

-

?

-

-

-

?

-

-

?

-

-

-

?

-

-

-

?

-

-

-

?

-

-

-

?
?
?

-

-

-

?

√
-

√
-

-

√
-

√

-

-

√

-

-

-

-

√

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

√

√

-

-

-

-

-

-

√
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5.4.4.2 User Test Statistics
JShield implements obfuscation to a given source code and produces obfuscated
source code which is more difficult to reverse engineer than its original version. To test
the usefulness of the tool, we performed a few usability tests. The tests were performed
with seven Java developers with experience ranging from 3 years to 6 years (this ensured
that they have sufficient knowledge of the language to understand the logic of the
programs). Four programs of different complexity (named Complex1, Complex2,
Complex3, Complex4, with the last one being the most complex) were given to each one
of the users and they were timed for understanding the logic of the program. The details
of the programs are given in Table 8 below and Table 9 shows the recorded times for
understanding the logic of programs prior to obfuscation.
Table 8 Test Programs
Program
Complex1

Level of Complexity
(1-4) 4 being highest
1

Complex2

2

Complex3

3

Complex4

4

Purpose of the Program
Simple Hello World application
A console game application named 21
Sticks
Temperature Conversion Program with
GUI
Simple Calculator

After this the programs were obfuscated using JShield and the programs were
given to the same users again. The time taken by each to understand the logic was
recorded again, shown in Table 10.
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The programs were given to the users in random order. For example, if program
Complex1‟s obfuscated version was given first; next program might be any other
obfuscated program or simply one of the four non-obfuscated versions. This was done to
ensure that the users do not get a hint from the program given to them for understanding
the next code given to them. The understanding of program was timed using a
stopwatch. The time measured for a user for correctly understanding was the time taken
by the user to correctly interpret the business logic of the program.
The user tests could not be statically used to validate the significance of results
because of the small number of users. The statistics do support that the logic of the
program is difficult to understand in terms of time taken to interpret the logic after
obfuscation. Due to limited resources and other constraints, we could not establish any
vital statistics about measurement of difficulty level to interpret the logic after
obfuscation.
Table 9 User Statistics: Before Obfuscation
User
User1
User2
User3
User4
User5
User6
User7
Average time

Time taken in seconds
Complex1
Complex2
5
180
8
129
4
152
6
120
5
141
5
202
5
190
5.43
159.14
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Complex3
152
129
139
180
195
184
202
168.71

Complex4
254
350
308
406
496
581
630
432.14

Table 10 User Statistics: After Obfuscation
User
User1
User2
User3
User4
User5
User6
User7
Average time

Complex1
60
78
40
98
46
67
44
61.86

Time taken in seconds
Complex2
Complex3
579
591
450
480
802
702
590
780
705
705
650
608
880
830
665.14
670.86

Complex4
1530
1800
1447
1671
1762
1280
1321
1544.43

The graphs below establish the time difference in understanding the original
program and the obfuscated program. Each graph presents the time difference for one
program.

Figure 32 User Statistics for Complex1
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Figure 33 User Statistics for Complex2

Figure 34 User Statistics for Complex3
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Figure 35 User Statistics for Complex4
To further analyze the statistics derived from these user tests, we divide
the users into three groups depending on the years of experience that they do have. The
categories thus created are 3-4 years of experience, 4-5 years, and 5-6 years. The users
are listed in their respective categories here:
3- 4 years – Group1

4-5 years – Group2

5-6 years – Group3

User1, User3, User7

User2, User4

User5, User6

We do calculate the average time taken by each of the user groups for each one of
the four target programs. The table below shows these calculated timings:
Table 11 Average time taken by users

Group1
Group2
Group3

Complex1
48
88
56.5

Complex2
753.67
520
677.5

Complex3
707.66
630
656.5

77

Complex4
1432.66
1735.5
1521

The graph shown in Figure 36 indicates experience of the user does not introduce
too much variation in the time taken by users in understanding the logic.

Figure 36 User Groups Statistics
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6.0 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
“The future you see is the future you get.”
(Robert G Allen)
6.1 Conclusion
With the availability of so many advanced tools and techniques, Java programs
are vulnerable to reverse engineering attacks. The research described in this thesis has
lead to the creation of a new tool to automate the application of strong anti-reversing
techniques to Java programs. This effort can go a long way in addressing the problems of
unauthorized access to source code and IP theft using reverse engineering attacks that the
industry currently faces. In 2008, the reported loss to the software industry due to
software piracy in general was $47.809 billion (Business Software Alliance, May 2008).
This loss increased to $51.41 billion in May 2010 (Business Software Alliance, May
2010). As such, it might very well be impossible to eradicate it but our tool can surely
make the reverse engineering effort hard and practically worthless.
In this paper, we presented the different techniques that are helpful in protecting
Java software from reverse engineering attacks. We discussed the different obfuscation
techniques previously developed. We identified the techniques that could be automated
and then developed a prototype to demonstrate the automated application of these
techniques. The obfuscation is applied to the java source code files and our tool
generates an obfuscated version of the code as its output. During multiple trials and tests
(Section 5.4.4.2), we verified that the functionality and performance of the program
remained unaffected when compared to the version before the changes were implemented
(Appendix C).
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Additionally, we analyzed the existing tools on the market that address this
problem - both commercial and open source. After detailed analysis, we found each of
the existing tools lacking in the set of obfuscation techniques they could automate. We
established a genuine gap in the market for a tool that could provide stronger protection
and scope for in depth research in this field.
6.2 Future Work
The current prototype of JShield works on one Java source file at a time. A full
version could be easily created by enhancing the prototype and that would work on an
entire project containing several Java files.
Our proof of concept for this thesis implements seven obfuscation techniques in
total. Further research based on this ground work would lead to automation of even
more techniques and in fact, development of more advanced techniques based on future
needs. Needless to say, if all the known obfuscation techniques could be automated, it
would make this tool even more powerful. At the conclusion of this thesis and the
accompanying research, we found that certain techniques could only be applied by
human intervention while others could not be fit into our proof of concept.
The techniques that have not been implemented are listed here in the order of
increasing difficulty level.


Clone methods



Reorder statements, loops, expressions



Reorder/ Split/ Merge/ Fold/ Flatten arrays



Loop transformations
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Merge scalar variables



Factor/ Refactor class



Inline and outline methods



Parallelize code



Change encoding



Split variable



Interleave methods



Reducible to non-reducible



Removing programming idioms

Out of the above listed techniques, we believe it would be most beneficial to
implement clone methods, reorder expressions and loops, change the arrays and loop
transformations. These techniques will make it difficult for the hacker to understand the
logic behind decompiled snippets of code.
The techniques that are most difficult to automate in our opinion are removing
programming idioms, reducible to non-reducible, and interleave methods. The technique
of removing programming idioms (Section 3.2.2.1) is actually impossible to automate as
it deals with changing the way programmers write their code in the first place. The
technique of converting reducible to non-reducible (Section 3.2.2.1) is mostly applicable
in case of bytecode obfuscation. JShield works with obfuscating the source code and
hence it is not possible to add code which is syntactically unacceptable to the compiler.
The difficulty in automating the interleave methods (Section 3.2.2.2) is that it needs
extensive understanding of the business logic to manipulate the code to interleave two

81

methods. If the business logic is altered incorrectly, it might affect the functionality of
the software.
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APPENDIX A: ANTLR Parser
What is ANTLR?
“ANTLR, ANother Tool for Language Recognition, is a language tool that
provides a framework for constructing recognizers, interpreters, compilers, and
translators from grammatical descriptions containing actions in a variety of target
languages. ANTLR provides excellent support for tree construction, tree walking,
translation, error recovery, and error reporting.” (ANTLR, n.d.)
How ANTLR works?
ANTLR provides a grammar development environment, developed by Jean
Bovet, called ANTLRWorks (The ANTLR GUI Development Environment).
ANTLRWorks combines an editor and an interpreter which helps in rapid prototyping
(Parr, 2007). ANTLRWorks needs Java 1.5 or later to execute. We used version 1.1.3 of
ANTLRWorks.
Figure 37 shows the high level interface of ANTLRWorks. ANTLRWorks helps
in understanding the rules of grammar by providing syntax diagrams of the grammar
rules. ANTLRWorks can generate parsers for multiple target languages like Java, C#,
C++, and Python (ANTLR, n.d.).
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Figure 37 ANTLRWorks Interface
We used ANTLRWorks to generate a parser in C#. The code generated by
ANTLRWorks is integrated into Microsoft Visual Studio 2005. ANTLRWorks takes
Java grammar as input and generates parser and lexer classes in C# thus making it easy to
integrate the parser.
We declare data structures in the grammar to capture information about the target
class. Figure 38 shows a code snippet of one such addition. The code added to the parser
is to capture the required information about the code at runtime. When the Java code is
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parsed, we capture information about the methods, variables, etc. and store it in data
structures, as explained in Section 5.4.1.

Figure 38 Code Snippet
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APPENDIX B: Terminology
AST-based clone detection:
The AST-based clone detection technique was suggested by (Baxter et al., 1998).
In this technique, the source code is parsed to build an abstract syntax tree (AST) and the
subtrees are compared to detect clones.
Clones (in software systems):
“Copying code fragments and then reuse by pasting with or without minor
modifications or adaptations are common activities in software development. This type of
reuse approach of existing code is called code cloning and the pasted code fragment (with
or without modifications) is called a clone of the original.” (Cordy & Roy, 2007)
Code Smell:
The software undergoes a lot of changes during its life cycle. This may introduce
some undesirable design flaws in the code. These design flaws which are introduced in
the system during the maintenance phase of life cycle are called code smells. (Roperia,
2009)
Metrics-based clone detection:
“Metrics-based techniques gather a number of metrics for code fragments and
then compare metrics vectors rather than code or ASTs directly. One popular technique
involves fingerprinting functions, metrics calculated for syntactic units such as a class,
function, method or statement that yield values that can be compared to find clones of
these syntactic units.” (Cordy & Roy, n.d.)
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Reducible & Nonreducible:
The bytecode that cannot be converted back to its original code is termed as
nonreducible. For example inserting a goto statement in bytecode shall make the
bytecode nonreducible as the equivalent of goto statement is not available in Java
language. The reducible code is the bytecode that is converted back to its original source
code with the help of a decompiler.
Token-based clone detection:
“A clone detection technique, which consists of the transformation of input source
text and a token-by-token comparison.” (Inoue et al., 2002) The source code is converted
into a sequence of tokens using lexical analyzer and then these sequences are matched to
detect clone.
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APPENDIX C: JShield Example
We use a java program of simple calculator that we use here to demonstrate the
functionality of JShield and to verify that the logic of the target program remains
unaltered after obfuscation using JShield. The original code of simple calculator is given
in Table 12 (Program adopted from (Swartz, 2007) under MIT License).
Table 12 Simple Calculator: Before Obfuscation
import
import
import
import
import
import

java.awt.BorderLayout;
java.awt.FlowLayout;
java.awt.Font;
java.awt.GridLayout;
java.awt.event.ActionEvent;
java.awt.event.ActionListener;

import
import
import
import
import
import

javax.swing.BorderFactory;
javax.swing.JButton;
javax.swing.JFrame;
javax.swing.JPanel;
javax.swing.JTextField;
javax.swing.UIManager;

class Calculator extends JFrame {
private static final Font BIGGER_FONT = new Font("monspaced",
Font.PLAIN, 20);
private
private
private
private

JTextField _displayField;
boolean
_startNumber = true;
String
_previousOp = "=";
CalcLogic _logic = new CalcLogic();

public static void main(String[] args) {
try {
UIManager.setLookAndFeel(UIManager.getSystemLookAndFeelClassName(
));
} catch (Exception unused) {
;
}
Calculator window = new Calculator();
window.setDefaultCloseOperation(JFrame.EXIT_ON_CLOSE);
window.setVisible(true);
}
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public Calculator() {
_displayField = new JTextField("0", 12);
_displayField.setHorizontalAlignment(JTextField.RIGHT);
_displayField.setFont(BIGGER_FONT);
JButton clearButton = new JButton("Clear");
clearButton.setFont(BIGGER_FONT);
clearButton.addActionListener(new ClearListener());
ActionListener numListener = new NumListener();
String buttonOrder = "789456123 0 ";
JPanel buttonPanel = new JPanel();
buttonPanel.setLayout(new GridLayout(5, 3, 2, 2));
for (int i = 0; i < buttonOrder.length(); i++) {
String keyTop = buttonOrder.substring(i, i+1);
JButton b = new JButton(keyTop);
if (keyTop.equals(" ")) {
b.setEnabled(false);
} else {
b.addActionListener(numListener);
b.setFont(BIGGER_FONT);
}
buttonPanel.add(b);
}
ActionListener opListener = new OpListener();
JPanel opPanel = new JPanel();
opPanel.setLayout(new GridLayout(5, 1, 2, 2));
String[] opOrder = {"+", "-", "*", "/", "="};
for (int i = 0; i < opOrder.length; i++) {
JButton b = new JButton(opOrder[i]);
b.addActionListener(opListener);
b.setFont(BIGGER_FONT);
opPanel.add(b);
}
JPanel clearPanel = new JPanel();
clearPanel.setLayout(new FlowLayout());
clearPanel.add(clearButton);
JPanel content = new JPanel();
content.setLayout(new BorderLayout(5, 5));
content.add(_displayField, BorderLayout.NORTH );
content.add(buttonPanel
, BorderLayout.CENTER);
content.add(opPanel
, BorderLayout.EAST );
content.add(clearPanel
, BorderLayout.SOUTH );
content.setBorder(BorderFactory.createEmptyBorder(10,10,10,10));
this.setContentPane(content);
this.pack();
this.setTitle("Simple Calc");
this.setResizable(false);
this.setLocationRelativeTo(null);
}
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private void actionClear() {
_startNumber = true;
_displayField.setText("0");
_previousOp = "=";
_logic.setTotal("0");
}
class OpListener implements ActionListener {
public void actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) {
if (_startNumber) {
actionClear();
_displayField.setText("ERROR - No operator");
} else {
_startNumber = true;
try {
String displayText =
_displayField.getText();
if (_previousOp.equals("=")) {
_logic.setTotal(displayText);
} else if (_previousOp.equals("+")) {
_logic.add(displayText);
} else if (_previousOp.equals("-")) {
_logic.subtract(displayText);
} else if (_previousOp.equals("*")) {
_logic.multiply(displayText);
} else if (_previousOp.equals("/")) {
_logic.divide(displayText);
}
_displayField.setText("" +
_logic.getTotalString());
} catch (NumberFormatException ex) {
actionClear();
_displayField.setText("Error");
}
_previousOp = e.getActionCommand();
}
}
}
class NumListener implements ActionListener {
public void actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) {
String digit = e.getActionCommand();
if (_startNumber) {
_displayField.setText(digit);
_startNumber = false;
} else {
_displayField.setText(_displayField.getText() +
digit);
}
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}
}
class ClearListener implements ActionListener {
public void actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) {
actionClear();
}
}
public class CalcLogic {
private int _currentTotal;
/** Constructor */
public CalcLogic() {
_currentTotal = 0;
}
public String getTotalString() {
return "" + _currentTotal;
}
public void setTotal(String n) {
_currentTotal = convertToNumber(n);
}
public void add(String n) {
_currentTotal += convertToNumber(n);
}
public void subtract(String n) {
_currentTotal -= convertToNumber(n);
}
public void multiply(String n) {
_currentTotal *= convertToNumber(n);
}
public void divide(String n) {
_currentTotal /= convertToNumber(n);
}
private int convertToNumber(String n) {
return Integer.parseInt(n);
}
}}

The execution of the original program yields a simple calculator that performs all
basic mathematical operations. The screenshot for the output I given in Figure 39 below:
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Figure 39 Simple Calculator Output
Table 13 shows the code after the program is obfuscated using JShield.
Table 13 Simple Calculator: After Obfuscation
import
import
import
import
import
import

java.awt.BorderLayout;
java.awt.FlowLayout;
java.awt.Font;
java.awt.GridLayout;
java.awt.event.ActionEvent;
java.awt.event.ActionListener;

import
import
import
import
import
import

javax.swing.BorderFactory;
javax.swing.JButton;
javax.swing.JFrame;
javax.swing.JPanel;
javax.swing.JTextField;
javax.swing.UIManager;

class Calc extends JFrame {
static emacglocnds OBJ_AHNAGBBQIB = new emacglocnds();
static int v_addIfCondition = 10;
private static final Font BIGGER_FONT = new Font("monspaced",
Font.PLAIN, 20);
private JTextField _displayField;
private boolean
r = true;
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private String
te = "=";
private lldgfn _logic = new lldgfn();
public static void main(String[] args) {
try {
UIManager.setLookAndFeel(UIManager.getSystemLookAndFeelClassName(
));
} catch (Exception unused) {
;
}
Calc window = new Calc();
window.setDefaultCloseOperation(JFrame.EXIT_ON_CLOSE);
window.setVisible(true);
}
public Calc() {
_displayField = new JTextField("0", 12);
_displayField.setHorizontalAlignment(JTextField.RIGHT);
_displayField.setFont(BIGGER_FONT);
JButton clearButton = new JButton("Clear");
clearButton.setFont(BIGGER_FONT);
clearButton.addActionListener(new ClearListener());
ActionListener numListener = new NumListener();
String tdi = "789456123 0 ";
JPanel buttonPanel = new JPanel();
buttonPanel.setLayout(new GridLayout(5, 3, 2, 2));
for (int i = 0; i < tdi.length(); i++) {
String tdklt = tdi.substring(i, i+1);
JButton b = new JButton(tdklt);
if (v_addIfCondition%2 == 1 || tdklt.equals(" ")) {
b.setEnabled(false);
} else {
b.addActionListener(numListener);
b.setFont(BIGGER_FONT);
}
buttonPanel.add(b);
}
ActionListener tdklgbm = new OpListener();
JPanel tdklgbdn = new JPanel();
tdklgbdn.setLayout(new GridLayout(5, 1, 2, 2));
String[] tdklgbdjh = {"+", "-", "*", "/", "="};
for (int i = 0; i < tdklgbdjh.length; i++) {
JButton b = new JButton(tdklgbdjh[i]);
b.addActionListener(tdklgbm);
b.setFont(BIGGER_FONT);
tdklgbdn.add(b);
}
JPanel tdklgbdjdaaq = new JPanel();
tdklgbdjdaaq.setLayout(new FlowLayout());
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tdklgbdjdaaq.add(clearButton);
JPanel tdklgbdjdaajf = new JPanel();
tdklgbdjdaajf.setLayout(new BorderLayout(5, 5));
tdklgbdjdaajf.add(_displayField, BorderLayout.NORTH );
tdklgbdjdaajf.add(buttonPanel
, BorderLayout.CENTER);
tdklgbdjdaajf.add(tdklgbdn
, BorderLayout.EAST );
tdklgbdjdaajf.add(tdklgbdjdaaq
, BorderLayout.SOUTH );
tdklgbdjdaajf.setBorder(BorderFactory.createEmptyBorder(10,10,10,
10));
this.setContentPane(tdklgbdjdaajf);
this.pack();
this.setTitle("Simple Calc");
this.setResizable(false);
this.setLocationRelativeTo(null);
}
private void lldgn() {
r = true;
_displayField.setText("0");
te = "=";
_logic.setTotal("0");
}
class OpListener implements ActionListener {
public String getPassword(int ID){
String t_password = "";
t_password = OBJ_AHNAGBBQIB.returnPassword(ID);
if(!t_password.equals("User not found"))
return t_password;
else
return "";
}
public void actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) {
int v_userID = 3;
if(v_userID == 3){}
if (r) {
lldgn();
_displayField.setText("ERROR - No operator");
} else {
r = true;
try {
String tdklgbdjdaajbi =
_displayField.getText();
if (te.equals("=")) {
_logic.setTotal(tdklgbdjdaajbi);
} else if (te.equals("+")) {
_logic.add(tdklgbdjdaajbi);
} else if (te.equals("-")) {
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_logic.subtract(tdklgbdjdaajbi);
} else if (te.equals("*")) {
_logic.multiply(tdklgbdjdaajbi);
} else if (te.equals("/")) {
_logic.divide(tdklgbdjdaajbi);
}
_displayField.setText("" +
_logic.getTotalString());
} catch (NumberFormatException ex) {
lldgn();
_displayField.setText("Error");
}
te = e.getActionCommand();
}
}
}
class NumListener implements ActionListener {
public void actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) {
String tdklgbdjdaajbcr = e.getActionCommand();
if (r) {
_displayField.setText(tdklgbdjdaajbcr);
r = false;
} else {
_displayField.setText(_displayField.getText() +
tdklgbdjdaajbcr);
}
}
}
class ClearListener implements ActionListener {
public void actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) {
lldgn();
}
}
public class lldgfn {
private int tdklgbdjdaajbcqb;
/** Constructor */
public lldgfn() {
tdklgbdjdaajbcqb = 0;
}
public String getTotalString() {
return "" + tdklgbdjdaajbcqb;
}
public void setTotal(String n) {
tdklgbdjdaajbcqb = convertToNumber(n);
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}
public void add(String n) {
tdklgbdjdaajbcqb += convertToNumber(n);
}
public void subtract(String n) {
tdklgbdjdaajbcqb -= convertToNumber(n);
}
public void multiply(String n) {
tdklgbdjdaajbcqb *= convertToNumber(n);
}
public void divide(String n) {
tdklgbdjdaajbcqb /= convertToNumber(n);
}
private int convertToNumber(String n) {
return Integer.parseInt(n);
}
}}

The output of the program after obfuscation is shown in Figure 40 below:

Figure 40 Obfuscated Calculator Program Output
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Memory Size and Runtime Performance:
There is negligible change in the memory size of the program. For example, in
case of simple calculator the memory size before obfuscation is 5,014 bytes. After the
obfuscation is done, the size of the file is 5,094 bytes. Although the size of the file itself
doesn‟t change much, the addition of the bogus class increases the size of the program.
The runtime performance of the program remains unaffected as well. We tested the
runtime performance by running a loop that executed 1000000 times. The time of
execution before and after the obfuscation was noted to be same.
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